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II. Conclusion
The practical result of Bennett is depressing. The Commonwealth's
attorney acted unethically in his use of inflammatory argument at least in
that he did not "avoid any . . . conduct calculated to gain special
consideration."5 1 While he will never be punished for attempting to
51 Va. Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-13. Other profes-
sional responsibility norms may also be implicated. Va. Code of
Professional Responsibility DR 7-105(C)(3) and (4) (In appearing in his
professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not assert his
personal knowledge of the facts in issue or assert his personal opinion as
to the justness of a cause); Va. Code of Professional Responsibility EC
7-21 (The expression by a lawyer of his personal opinion as to the
justness of a cause.., is not proper subject for argument to the trier of
fact); Va. Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-33 (Although a
lawyerhas the duty to representhis client zealously, he should notengage
in any conduct that offends the dignity and decorum of proceedings); Va.
create unwarranted prejudice in the defendant's trial, the Common-
wealth will probably execute Bennett as the law requires, unless the
United State Supreme Court grants a writ of certiorari.
Summary and Analysis by:
David T. McIndoe
Code of Professional Responsibility EC 8-10 (The responsibility of a
public prosecutor.., is to seek justice... during trial the prosecutor is
not only an advocate but he also may make decisions ... and those
affecting the public interest should be fair to all). See also, ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice 3-5.8(c)&(d) (The prosecutor should not
use arguments calculated to appeal to the prejudices of the jury. The
prosecutor should refrain from argument which would divert the jury
from its duty to decide the case on the evidence); ABA Model Rules of
Professional ConductRule 3.A(e) (a lawyershall not in trial, allude to any
matter the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not
be supported by admissible evidence.., or state a personal opinion as to
the justness of a cause).
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FACTS
On February 6, 1985, Helen Schartner's body was found in a field
across the street from a nightclub which she and Joseph O'Dell had left
at approximately the same time the previous night. Schartner had died
from manual strangulation and had suffered eight head wounds which
had bled extensively. About two hours after leaving the nightclub,
O'Dell appeared in a convienience store. He was covered in blood. He
phoned his girlfriend who allowed him to sleep at her home after he told
her that the blood came from his own regurgitation. After reading about
Helen Schartner's murder in the local newspaper, O'Dell's girlfriend
went to her garage and discovered a brown bag full of bloody clothes
which she turned over to the police. 1
On October 10, 1986, Joseph O'Dell, who proceeded pro se, was
convicted of capital murder for the killing of Helen Schartner.2 The jury
found both vileness and future dangerousness and sentenced O'Dell to
death. O'Dell appealed, but the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the
trialcourt. 3 Subsequently, the Supreme Court ofVirginiagranted O'Dell's
petition for rehearing, considered and rejected a claim it had previously
found barred, and again affirmed his conviction and death sentence.4 On
October 3, 1988, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.
5
IO'Dell v. Netherland, 95 F.3d 1214, 1218-19 (4th Cir. 1996).
2 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(5) (killing in the commission of rape or
attempted rape).
3 O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672,364 S.E.2d 491 (1988).
4 0'Dell v. Commonwealth, Record No. 861219, slip op. (Va. April
1, 1988).
5 O'Dell v. Virginia, 488 U.S. 871 (1988).
6 O'Dell, 95 F.3d at 1218, 1219 (citing O'Dell v. Thompson, 502
U.S. 995 (1991)).
O'Dell next filed for a writ of habeas corpus in state court. His
petition, as amended, was denied. O'Dell again sought relief from the
Supreme Court of Virginia; however, he misnamed his appeal "Assign-
ments of Error" as opposed to "Petition for Appeal." Although O'Dell
attempted to correct his mistake, by then the time to file had expired.
Consequently, the Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed his appeal. The
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on December 2, 1991
with three Justices noting that the case "should ... receive careful
consideration." 6
O'Dell filed a federal habeas petition on July 23,1992.7 The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia vacated O'Dell's
sentence. O'Dell argued that he was entitled to the benefit of the rule
handed down in Simmons v. South Carolina.8 Simmons held that a
defendant has a constitutional right to rebut the Commonwealth's
evidence of future dangerousness with the fact of the defendant's parole
ineligibility if sentenced to life in prison instead of death.9 To find for
O'Dell, the district court initially had to determine whether the doctrine
first announced in Teague v. Lane10 denied O'Dell the benefit of
Simmons. Teague held that, with narrow exceptions, habeas petitioners
will not be entitled to the benefit of favorable United States Supreme
Court decisions that impose constitutional obligations that state courts
could not have reasonably anticipated.1 1 In other words, if Simmons
7 Id. at 1219.
8 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994).
9 Id. at2193. Because of his priorrecord, O'Dell would have been
sentenced to life in prison, and he would have been ineligible for parole
under former Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-151. O'Dell, 95 F.3d at 1220.
10 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
11 Id. at 310.
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announced an unforeseeable rule, a "new rule," then O'Dell was not
entitled to its benefit.
The district court found that Simmons did not announce a "new
rule"; consequently, O'Dell was entitled to its benefit. Thus, the court
held that O'Dell was denied due process of law and subjected to cruel and
unusual punishment under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution because the trial court prevented him from
presenting the fact of his parole ineligibility to rebut the Commonwealth's
evidence of future dangerousness. 12 The district court also granted
O'Dell relief on the Supreme Court of Virginia's denial of his appeal as
time-barred. The court held, relying on James v. Kentucky,13 that the
distinction between assignments of error and petitions for appeal was not
"firmly established" in capital cases; thus, the Supreme Court of Virginia's
decision that O'Dell was procedurally barred was not an adequate state
ground to bar federal habeas review.14 The Commonwealth appealed.
HOLDING
In a seven to six split, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
en banc, reversed the district court and held that the rule announced in
Simmons was a new rule.15 Interpreting the Teague doctrine, the court
found that at the time O'Dell's conviction and sentence became final, a
reasonable jury could have found that the law then in existence did not
compel the rule announced inSimmons.16 Moreover, the rule of Simmons
did not fit within either of two narrow exceptions provided for in Teague.
The court found that there was no question that the rule of Simmons did
not place O'Dell's conduct outside that which is criminal, one such
exception, and that the Simmons rule was not a watershed rule of due
process akin to that of Gideon v. Wainwright,17 the second exception.
Hence, O'Dell was not entitled to the benefit of Simmons. 18 The court
also reversed the district court's finding that no adequate state ground
existed to bar federal habeas review.19 Finally, the court rejected
O'Dell's claims of actual innocence.20
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
L Simmons Is a New Rule
As the dissent's analysis makes clear, the contested issue in O'Dell's
case was whether the rule of Simmons was a new constitutional require-
ment unavailable to O'Dell or whether it was the application of existing
due process law to a new factual setting in which case O'Dell must be
accorded a new sentencing hearing.2 1 The majority's analysis is a life or
death game of semantics-in which the court expands and contracts
precedent to achieve its desired result. Nowhere in this fifty-page opinion
does anyone suggest that it might be bizarre to kill a man when there is
no dispute over the fact that his trial was infected with fundamental
constitutional error.
12 O'Dell, 95 F.3d at 1218.
13 466 U.S. 341 (1984).
14 O'Dell, 95 F.3d at 1240-41.
15 Id. at 1218.
16 Id. at 1238.
17 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (requiring the appointment of counsel to
indigent criminal defendants).
18 O'Dell, 95 F.3d at 1238-39.
19 Id. at 1244.
20 Id. at 1254.
21 Id. at 1255-61.
22 "Final" is generally accepted as the date the United States
A. The Basics of Teague v. Lane
As noted, Teague v. Lane held that a defendant may not benefit
retroactively from a new constitutional rule after his conviction becomes
final, 22 unless the new rule falls within one of two exceptions.23 The
court of appeals explained that any analysis under Teague requires three
steps: (1) determining the date on which the defendant's conviction and
sentence became final, (2) surveying the legal landscape as of this date
to determine whether a state court at that time would have felt compelled
by existing precedent to conclude that the rule the defendant seeks was
required by the Constitution, and (3) even if the court finds that the rule
is new and the defendant may not benefit by it, the court must decide
whether that rule falls within one of the two narrow exceptions to the
nonretroactivity principle.
The court emphasized that under the second prong of analysis, a rule
is not new under Teague only if it was compelled by existing precedent
at the time a defendant's conviction became final.24 "Compelled" is the
operative word; it is not sufficient that precedent "dictated" or that a
petitioner's challenge was "predicated upon" precedent.25 To reach this
conclusion, the court overruled its own precedent which was decided as
recently as one year ago-Turner v. Williams,26 and Ostrander v.
Green.27 The court reasoned that the very purpose of Teague was to bar
federal review of state decisions even if proven incorrect as long as they
were reasonable. Because the Turner and Ostrander tests would not
achieve that goal, the cases were in error to the extent that they suggested
that Teague was inapplicable to cases to which these tests applied. 28 Now
the query in the Fourth Circuit is as follows: unless it would have been
objectively unreasonable for a state court in [insert date conviction
became final] to conclude the Constitution did notrequire that [insert rule
defendant seeks], [insert new case law] must be held to have announced
a new rule.
29
B. Simmons Is a New Rule Not an Old Rule Applied to New
Facts
The majority opinion revealed a resolve to affirm O'Dell's death
sentence by acknowledging that its conclusion (Simmons was a new rule)
depended entirely upon the level of generality with which its analysis
under Teague was conducted:
In making this determination, of course, the "rule" [here, the
holding of Simmons] must be identified at the appropriately
specific level of generality. The appropriate level of generality
for identifying the rule is that level represented by the narrow-
est principle of law that was actually applied in order to decide
the case in question.
30
Supreme Court denies certiorari on direct appeal from state court. Id. at
1221.
23 489 U.S. at 307, 310.
24 O'Dell, 95 F.3d at 1221-22.
25 Id.
26 35 F.3d 872 (4th Cir. 1994) (stating that a rule "dictated" by
precedent was not new).
27 46 F.3d 347 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that a rule "predicated upon
precedent" was not new).
28 O'Dell, 95 F.3d at 1222.
29 Id. at 1223-24.
30 Id. at 1223.
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The court proceeded with its Teague analysis, interpreting prece-
dent with an accordion-like approach, placing a narrow reading on all
precedent that might have benefited O'Dell, while broadly interpreting
precedent adverse to him.
1. Law Beneficial to O'Dell Read Narrowly
It was, of course, critical to the court's analysis that it not reach the
level of generality that would require seeing Simmons forwhat it was: the
application of a well-settled due process principle to new facts. The due
process rule was that in the penalty phase, a criminal defendant must be
given a meaningful opportunity to explain or deny evidence presented
against him. The new facts created the question of whether a state's
refusal to permit the sentencing jury to hear the fact of the defendant's
parole ineligibility violated this due process rule. In Simmons, the United
States Supreme Court said that it did. To avoid this logical conclusion,
the court of appeals limited the "rule" of Simmons to the narrowest
principle from Justice O'Connor's concurrence:
"Where the State puts the defendant's future dangerousness in
issue, and the only available alternative sentence to death is life
imprisonment without possibility of parole, due process en-
titles the defendant to inform the capital sentencing jury-by
either argument or instruction-that he is parole ineligible."3 1
According to the court of appeals, this language meant that Simmons,
did not apply the well-settled rule that a defendant has a constitutional
right to a meaningful opportunity to rebut evidence of future dangerous-
ness to a new set of facts; instead, Simmons narrowly held that a
defendant could tell a jury if he was in fact parole ineligible, either
through closing argument or ajury instruction. 32 The court was then able
to discuss whether state court jurists who "surveyed the legal landscape"
in 1988 when O'Dell's conviction became final would find this nar-
rowly-drawn rule.
Looking at the 1988 legal landscape, the court stated that jurists
would have first found the precedent upon which the court understood
Simmons to have "principally relied":33 Skipper v. South Carolina34 and
Gardner v. Florida35 In Skipper, the defendant was not permitted to
rebut the prosecutor's evidence of future dangerousness with evidence of
his prior good behavior while injail. In other words, the defendant could
not put forward factual evidence that argued against his being a future
danger to others. Both the majority and all three concurring Justices
found that this bar created by the state court constituted a due process
violation.36 The facts of Simmons present the same scenario: the defen-
dant was not allowed to put forth factual evidence that he did not pose a
future danger to others. Nevertheless, the court in O'Dell ruled that a
jurist could reasonably find that Skipper did not "comper' the narrowly-
drawn rule of Simmons.
The court explained that because the Supreme Court's grant of
certiorari in Skipper was framed "solely" as an Eighth Amendment issue
whileSimmons rested on a due process grounds,jurists could reasonably
conclude that Skipper did not compel the result in Simmons.37 It remains
plain, however, that the concern in Skipper was the same concern the
31 Id. (quoting Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2201. (O'Connor, J., joined
by Rehnquist, CJ., and Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)).
32 Id.
33 Id. at 1224.
34 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
35 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
36 Skipper, 476 U.S. at 5 n.1, 9.
37 O'Dell, 95 F.3d at 1225.
38 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
Supreme Court later addressed in Simmons: the defendant's constitu-
tional right to a meaningful opportunity to explain or deny the state's case
of future dangerousness cannot be impeded by the state, and this rule
against state impediment includes the rule that the state cannot refuse to
permit the defendant's introduction of factual evidence about himself,
either his good behavior while incarcerated or his parole ineligibility.
In addition to Skipper, stated the courtjurists would also have found
Gardner v. Florida.38 In Gardner, the Supreme Court vacated a death
sentence because the sentencing court had violated the defendant's
constitutional rights when it relied upon a secret report that the defendant
never had the opportunity to rebut. The court dismissed Gardner as
compelling precedent on the same ground that it had dismissed Skipper,
contending that because Gardnerrested on Eighth Amendment grounds,
a jurist could not have found that it compelled the result in Simmons, a
due process case. The court was able to draw this conclusion by again
looking to the most narrow language of the opinion. In Gardner, it was
Justice White's concurrence. Justice White concurred in the judgment on
the fact-specific ground that state reliance on secret information to
sentence a man to death violates the Eighth Amendment, although not
necessarily dueprocess.39 Hence, areasonablejurist looking at Gardner,
like Skipper, could conclude that it did not "compel" Simmons.
Nevertheless, it remains apparent that Gardner too is founded on
the same principle as Skipper. If the state's evidence is secret, the
defendant cannot rebut it with accurate information of his own because
the state has prevented him from doing so by keeping the information
from him. Both cases explain that ifa state court denies the defendant the
ability to rebut the state's case at sentencing, that denial violates his
constitutional rights.40 More importantly, it is plain that Gardner and
Skipper compelled the result in Simmons. The same issue was before the
Court: whether the state court's obstructing the defendant's ability to
accurately rebut the prosecution's case at sentencing violated the Consti-
tution. It did. In fact, the O'Dell court even grudgingly admitted that
"[w]ere Gardner and Skipper the totality of the 'legal landscape' in 1988,
the claim that Simmons was not a new rule, might, at least at first blush,
have considerable force." 41 However, Gardner and Simmons did not
constitute the whole of the legal landscape in 1988.
2. Law Adverse to O'Dell Read Broadly
The court explained that reasonable jurists in 1988 would not only
have found Gardner and Skipper, but would also have found California
v. Ramos,42 a decision which would have allowed them to conclude that
Simmons announced a "new rule."43 Unabashed, the court accorded its
analysis of Ramos a level of generality not accorded to Gardner or
Skipper:
No doubt, areasonablejurist in 1988, considering whether the
Constitution necessarily required the rule of Simmons, would
also have focused immediately upon the broad principles of
deference to state decisions regarding the substantive factors
that juries may consider during sentencing, which underlay the
[Ramos decision]. 44
39 O'Dell, 95 F.3d at 1224.
40 Moreover, the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment
clause has been incorporated into Fourteenth Amendment due process.
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
41 O'Dell, 95 F.3d at 1225.
42 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
43 O'Dell, 95 F.3d at 1225-26.
44 Id. at 1227. (emphasis added).
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In Ramos, the trial court had refused to allow the defendant to
present to the jury the fact that the Governor could commute a death
sentence where California state law required that the jury be told of the
Governor's same power to commute alife imprisonment-without-parole
sentence. The Supreme Court held that this refusal did not violate the
defendant's constitutional rights because the state had not "preclude[d]
the defendant from offering any evidence or argument regarding the
Governor's power to commute a life sentence."'45
Yet, the O'Dell court did not limit Ramos to this language, or its
most narrow rationale. Adhering to its own principle here would mean
thatRamos did not conflictwith Gardner, Skipper, and most importantly,
Simmons. If Ramos was not conflicting, then Simmons did not announce
an unforeseeable, new rule and O'Dell would be entitled to its benefit.
Thus, the court read Ramos broadly and found that the general argument
forwarded by Ramos was essentially the same as that arguedby Simmons:
the information not brought before the jury was necessary to rebut the
mistaken impression that only a death sentence wouldprevent defendant's
return to society.46
The majority did note that since the Supreme Court did not overrule
GardnerorSkipperand since Simmons came afterRamos, the Courtmust
have viewed these cases as compatible. Finding itself compelled to so
conclude, the court reconciled the two lines of cases by drawing this
distinction: Gardner and Skipper concerned a defendant's right to rebut
the prosecution's claims with factual evidence, while Ramos concerned
a defendant's right to rebut theprosecution's claims with arguments from
state law.47 Accordingly, Simmons contradicted Ramos because it al-
lowed argumentbased on state law in "the narrow circumstance of capital
cases where future dangerousness is argued and the defendant is parole
ineligible." 48 In other words, because the fact of the defendant's parole
ineligibility arose from state law, to argue it constituted an argument
based on state law. Finally, the court concluded that because it would not
have been objectively unreasonable for ajury to draw this same distinc-
tion and thereby to conclude that Simmons announced a new rule,
Simmons did announce a new rule.
49
Ultimately, the court has created a distinction without a difference.
The court stated thatSimmons allows a defendant to argue from state law
as to his parole ineligibility in order to rebut the prosecution's evidence
of future dangerousness, while Gardner and Skipper allow a defendant
to argue from facts. Yet, the law is what creates the fact that a defendant
is parole ineligible. In either case, the defendant will argue facts relevant
to his defense against the prosecution's case, and it is his ability to argue
these facts that a state court cannot impede without violating the
Constitution. Ironically, the O'Dell court itself points to this central
principle of justice, quoting Jurek v. Texas:50 "[wihat is essential is that
the jury have before it all possible relevant information about the
individual defendant whose fate it must determine." 51 However, the
court is quick also to contend that while Jurek is still good law, its roots
are in the Eighth Amendment, not due process; hence it is distinct from
Simmons.52 But again the court is forced to recognize that this conclusion
is empty:
[1] t was factual evidence about the Eighth Amendment factors
relevant to the individual defendant which Gardner and Skip-
45 Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1004. (emphasis added).
46 O'Dell, 95 F.3d at 1226.
47 Id. at 1232.
48 Id. at 1234.
49 Id.
50 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976).
51 O'Dell, 95 F.3d at 1234.
52 Id.
per had held defendants had a due process right to introduce
in rebuttal of prosecution arguments concerning these fac-
tors. 53
Faced with its own accurate characterization of Gardner and
Skipper, the court was forced to distinguish Simmons as the first instance
where the Supreme Court held that there was a due process right to rebut
prosecution arguments with evidence unrelated to the defendant's char-
acterand crime.54Hence, according to thecourt, thefactof the defendant's
parole ineligibility is unrelated to his character and crime. For if it were
deemed a relevant fact about the defendant, then the rule of Simmons
must have sprung from Gardner and Skipper as a due process right, and
again, O'Dell would be entitled to its benefit.
Moreover, the fact that the court does not even address the relevance
principle established by Gardner and extended in Skipper and then in
Simmons underscores its weak position on this matter. Without such
analysis on the part of the court, the reader is left with this notion: the
facts of a secret report and good behavior while in jail are relevant to the
defendant's character and crime, but the fact of his parole ineligibility is
not. This reasoning ignores the principle at stake here, a principle we
have known since Gardner: the state may not infringe on a criminal
defendant's constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to deny or
explain evidence of future dangerousness offered against him. The idea
is straightforward: how can a defendant have a meaningful opportunity
to rebut the prosecution's argument about what the future will bring
without the ability to present all evidence relevant to the future?
3. Simmons not a watershed rule
Having concluded that Simmons announced a new rule, the court
further found that the new rule did not fit within either exception to the
non-retroactivity principle of Teague. First, it did not place any of the
defendant's conduct beyond that which the criminal law proscribes.
55
Second, the court rejected the argument that Simmons is a watershed rule
of criminal procedure. Without discussion, the court merely announced
that Simmons is not akin to Gideon; thus, it is not a bedrock procedural
element necessary to our understanding of fundamental faimess.56 But
a simple, yet powerful contention remains.
Simmons, it can be strongly argued, is as basic to our understanding
of a fair trial as is Gideon. Simmons held that due process gives a
defendant the right to be heard (as to parole ineligibility) in his defense,
either through argument or instruction. Gideon gave a defendant the right
to be heard in his defense through counsel. Certainly, the right to be heard
at all is as fundamental if not more fundamental than the right to be heard
through counsel, or even as later Supreme Court precedent has pre-
scribed, the right to be heard through effective counsel.
57
Unless and until the United States Supreme Court grants certiorari
on this issue, practitioners in Virginia must accept that Simmons did
announce a new rule and relinquish hope for those cases decided as of
October 1988. For cases where convictions became final post October
1988, there may be arguments that remain based on otherprecedent. One
tactic that counsel may consider is requesting a rehearing on direct
53 Id. (emphasis added).
54 Id.
55 Id. at 1238-39.
56 Id. at 1239.
57 Judge Ervin, in dissent, noted that had he agreed that Simmons
was a new rule, he would have also found a strong argument in O'Dell's
claim that the rule was a watershed rule of criminal procedure. O'Dell,
95 F.3d at 1261 n.ll.
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appeal, so that defendants may have the benefit of any new constitutional
law handed down post-conviction and sentence but prior to a denial of
certiorari by the United States Supreme Court.
Although the most careful lawyering cannot protect against unfa-
vorable rulings under the Teague doctrine, it can make the difference
with regard to procedural default. Even though it remains highly unlikely
that counsel will face the unique issues presented in O'Dell as they arose
from O'Dell's decision to proceed pro se, the opinion still serves as
another reminder that procedural default requires counsel to always
proceed with caution. The difficulty in avoiding default is illustrated by
two recent cases: Barnabei v. Commonwealth58 and Clagett v. Common-
wealth.59 This difficulty, in some cases, may warrant actions that add
delay. For example counsel may have to prolong trial proceedings by
making every conceivable argument to the judge for each objection
initially, and by renewing motions and objections, as well as making
proffers, late in the trial as new grounds and arguments come to mind.60
4. The dissent finds that Simmons was not a new rule
In his dissent, Judge Ervin found that even the "narrowest grounds"
of Gardner and Skipper were broad enough to include the due process
principle of a meaningful opportunity to defend againstthe prosecution's
case for future dangerousness. He noted that, logically, the same Consti-
tution that entitled a defendant to rebut future dangerousness with
evidence of his good behavior in jail (Skipper) must also entitle him to
rebut with evidence of parole ineligibility.61 If so, then Simmons sprang
from not only Skipper but the equally normative rule of Gardner which
held that a defendant is entitled to present all relevant evidence in
rebuttal.
62
Moreover, explained Judge Ervin, when Ramos is read for its
specific holding, it is clear that it too dealt with the defendant's ability to
get accurate, relevant evidence before the sentencing jury. Judge Ervin
explained that the Ramos Court specifically rested its refusal to find a
constitutional violation on the fact that the state court did not prevent
Ramos from presenting to the sentencing jury the fact of the Governor's
ability to commute a death sentence. Gardner, Skipper, and Simmons
presented the same concern: did the state prevent the sentencing jury
from hearing accurate, relevant information? In all four cases, there is no
suggestion that any of the factual evidence at bar was not relevant. Hence,
in this way, Ramos does not conflict with Simmons.
63
In other words, the Court since Gardner has held that a defendant
has a constitutional right to get accurate, relevant information before the
jury so as to rebut the prosecution's case at sentencing. Skipper extended
this fundamental constitutional rule to new facts and made clear that this
information includes good behavior while injail. Simmons, like Skipper,
is an extension of this rule to another set of facts, making clear that the
58 1996 WL 517733 (Va. 1996) (rejecting several different claims
as procedurally defaulted on various grounds). See also case summary
of Barnabei, Capital Defense Journal, this issue.
59 252 Va. 79,472 S.E.2d 263 (1996) (finding assignment of error
defaulted where counsel properly objected at trial but advanced different
argument on appeal than that presented to trial judge). See also case
summary of Clagett, Capital Defense Journal, this issue.
60 For a thorough treatment of Virginia's default and waiver
doctrinesee Groot, ToAttain TheEnds ofJustice: Confronting Virginia's
Default Rules in Capital Cases, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 2, p.
44 (1994).
61 O'Dell, 95 F.3d at 1258.
defendant is entitled to present parole ineligibility evidence; after all, it
too is relevant evidence in rebuttal of future dangerousness.
Ramos is not in conflict with these decisions because it presented a
different factual problem to the Court. There, as Judge Ervin explained,
unlike the situation in Simmons, the state court had given the sentencing
jury accurate information and the defendant was not precluded from
presenting additional accurate information. 64 Hence, in finding no
constitutional violation, the Court remained true to the due process rule
it laid down in Gardner and its progeny: it is unconstitutional for a state
to prevent a defendant from presenting accurate, relevant evidence to his
sentencing jury.
II. Procedural Bars
After the state habeas court dismissed O'Dell's petition, he filed a
document with the Supreme Court of Virginia entitled "Assignments of
Error."'65 However, Virginia law requires that an appeal from a denial of
the writ of habeas corpus must be entitled "Petition for Appeal." By the
time O'Dell tried to correct his error, the time for filing had expired and
the Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed his Petition for Appeal as
untimely under Va. S. Ct. Rule 5:17(a)(1). 6 6 Because O'Dell, who had
moved pro se, mistitled his document, his claim was barred. Thus, so
long as the dismissal rested on "adequate and independent state grounds," 67
it was sufficient to bar federal habeas review. To pass this test, the state
ground must have been "firmly established and regularly followed."
68
The court of appeals found that it was.
69
To defend this conclusion which amounted to a "death by technical-
ity," the majority explained at length that O'Dell really did file the wrong
paper and that there really is a distinction between appeal and petition.
70
Although it required a recitation of some length to analyze and explain
the law in Virginia, including the difference between direct appeal and
collateral review, the court, nonetheless, found that the law lacked
ambiguity. 71 Moreover, despite acknowledgment that the error was
certainly inadvertent, the court rested its conclusion on the importance of
state procedural rules, and found that O'Dell's claim was completely
barred.
72
By contrast, the court did not discuss whether this case was the first
in which the court found that this type of mistake by a pro se capital
defendant amounted to a default. Nor did the court discuss why the
Supreme Court of Virginia could not have taken the route that courts
often do when faced with a misnamed document where the author is a
prisoner proceeding pro se. The Supreme Court of Virginia could have
acknowledged that O'Dell did not have the right to a direct appeal
("Assignments of Error" is the wrong document; these are filed only on
direct appeal of a conviction and sentence) butnonetheless stated that the
court would treat his document as a petition for appeal and hear his case.
62 Id. at 1257-59.
63 Id. at 1259-61.
64 Id. at 1259-60.
65 Id. at 1240.
66 Id.
67 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977).
68 James, 466 U.S. at 348.
69 O'Dell, 95 F.3d at 1244.
70 Id. at 1239-44.
71 Id. at 1243.
72 Id. at 1245-46.
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Hence, the court's reliance on O'Dell's error constituting a failure to
properly invoke the Supreme Court of Virginia'sjurisdiction is question-
able.
3
m. New Evidence of Innocence
Having decided that O'Dell "inadvertently" had defaulted his
claims, the court of appeals went on to decide whether the federal habeas
court could have heard his claims on the merits despite the default. 74 In
order for the federal court to hear claims procedurally defaulted at the
state level, the defendant must either show cause for the default and
actual prejudice from the alleged violation of federal law or show that the
court's refusal to hear the claim will result in a"fundamental miscarriage
of justice."75 O'Dell argued that the court must hear his claim because
it was a claim of actual innocence and the failure to hear it would result
in a fundamental miscarriage ofjustice. Specifically, O'Dell's claim was
grounded upon new DNA evidence that conflicted with the evidence
presented at trial which tended to show that the blood on O'Dell's clothes
was consistent with Helen Schartuer's but not with his own. In assessing
whether O'Dell had made a colorable showing of innocence through the
new evidence, the court credited much of the serology evidence at trial
and dismissed the impact of the later DNA testing as minimal.
76
For a defendant to succeed on a claim of actual innocence which
otherwise is procedurally defaulted, he must show that "it is more likely
than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light
of the new evidence."77 The court rejected O'Dell's claim under this
standard, concluding that at most O'Dell's new evidence showed only
that "one of the many blood stains on his clothing did not come from
either himself or Helen Schartner." 78 This rejection was primarily based
on the court's reliance upon the evidence adduced at trial and its
disregard of the flaws in the trial evidence and its rejection of later
favorable DNA evidence offered by O'Dell to rebut the Commonwealth's
case. 79 Not only did the court acknowledge that this type of review
requires it to substitute itself for the jury and conclude what the evidence
showed, the court also acknowledged that it was forced to "guess" as to
how a jury would vote in light of this conclusion. 80 Here, the court
suggested thatit was powerless to abate this obvious difficulty. However,
the court was notpowerless; it could have remanded foranew sentencing
73 The court also went to great length to explain that O'Dell's ability
to proceedpro se was closely scrutinized and he had done well represent-
ing himself. This portion of the opinion is hauntingly reminiscent of
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (ruling that appointment of counsel
is notrequired ifdefendant is able to adequately defend himself)(overruled
by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)); the court stated: "[A]n
independent and thorough examination of the record reveals that O'Dell,
who was 'very intelligent,' had a college equivalency education, and
'exhibit[ed] tremendous courtroom skills,' defended himself far more
ably than many practicing attorneys could." O'Dell, 95 F.3d at 1244
n.24. This idea also appeared in the court's opinion. Id. at 1219.
74 Id. at 1246.
75 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,750 (1991).
76 O'Dell, 95 F.3d at 1246-54.
77 Schulp v.Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851, 867 (1995).
78 O'Dell, 95 F.3d at 1254.
79 Id. at 1247-54. The court's discussion of the DNA evidence as
hearing and found out exactly what ajury would have done with the new
evidence. The Commonwealth would not have lost its conviction and the
defendant would have been accorded a determination made by the
factfinding body. Our system would function as it promises. One would
think that doing so is completely justifiable considering that a life is at
stake.
Perhaps more important, however, is the court of appeals' sidestep-
ping a remand to the district court because the district court had evaluated
O'Dell's innocence evidence under the wrong standard of review. The
trial court had used the standard established in Sawyer v. Whitley81 when
the appropriate standard, adopted after the district court's decision, was
that established by Schulp.82 The Sawyer standard required that the
defendant show "by clear and convincing evidence that, but for consti-
tutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner"
guilty of murder. 83 The Schulp standard is not as stringent and requires
only a "more likely than not" showing. 84 The court decided that because
the district court had made factual findings "that are peculiarly within its
province," a remand was not necessary. 85 This decision was contrary to
Supreme Court action in several reversal cases, suggesting that a remand
is appropriate even where the factual record to decide the issue appeared
fully developed below, a situation not present in O'Dell's case. For
example, in United States v. Bagley,86 the Court remanded to the district
court to apply the appropriate standard the Court established therein for
the materiality of exculpatory material, although the nature and character
of that material was known to the court. And in United States v. Cronic,
87
the Court remanded to the court of appeals for a finding as to whether the
defendant had an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on
specific errors made at trial, although the trial record was before the
Court. Again in Gray v. Netherland,88 the Court remanded to the district
court for a finding where the facts showed an obvious effort on the part
of the prosecution to mislead the defendant. Hence, although the court of
appeals' decision here is not extraordinary, it certainly is unusual. Some
readers may even find it a disturbing conclusion where a life depends on
the balance struck by a court that is twice removed from presentation of
the facts.
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presented by the Commonwealth and by O'Dell's expert can be found
within these pages. The details are not particularly informative and are
too lengthy to repeat for the purpose of this summary. Of more interest,
is that the court affirmed the district court's grant of only a limited
evidentiary hearing on the matter, and then rejected the credibility of one
of O'Dell's witnesses because that witness was not subject to cross-
examination. Id. at 1254-55.
80 Id. at 1250.
81 505 U.S. 333 (1992).
82 115 S. Ct. at 867.
83 Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 336.
84 Schulp, 115 S. Ct. at 867.
85 O'Dell, 95 F.3d at 1249.
86 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
87 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
88 116 S. Ct. 2074 (1996).
